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Abstract
Background: Publication bias, as typically defined, refers to the decreased likelihood of studies'
results being published when they are near the null, not statistically significant, or otherwise "less
interesting." But choices about how to analyze the data and which results to report create a
publication bias within the published results, a bias I label "publication bias in situ" (PBIS).
Discussion:  PBIS may create much greater bias in the literature than traditionally defined
publication bias (the failure to publish any result from a study). The causes of PBIS are well known,
consisting of various decisions about reporting that are influenced by the data. But its impact is not
generally appreciated, and very little attention is devoted to it. What attention there is consists
largely of rules for statistical analysis that are impractical and do not actually reduce the bias in
reported estimates. PBIS cannot be reduced by statistical tools because it is not fundamentally a
problem of statistics, but rather of non-statistical choices and plain language interpretations. PBIS
should be recognized as a phenomenon worthy of study – it is extremely common and probably
has a huge impact on results reported in the literature – and there should be greater systematic
efforts to identify and reduce it. The paper presents examples, including results of a recent HIV
vaccine trial, that show how easily PBIS can have a large impact on reported results, as well as how
there can be no simple answer to it.
Summary: PBIS is a major problem, worthy of substantially more attention than it receives. There
are ways to reduce the bias, but they are very seldom employed because they are largely
unrecognized.
Background
A study is more likely to appear in the literature, and thus
be indexed and publicly available, if it shows a strong, sta-
tistically significant, or otherwise "better" result. A study
that does not show such results has a greater chance of
remaining hidden in a file drawer, either because the
author (or funder) does not think the result is worth men-
tioning, or because journals are less interested in publish-
ing studies that find "nothing". This form of publication
bias, wherein readers have access to only a biased sample
of the full distribution of results, is well studied, particu-
larly in the literature on meta-analysis and other system-
atic reviews where the problem is most apparent (a primer
on the topic can be found at the Cochrane Collaboration
webpage [1]). Even well-read lay people are, at the time of
this publication, aware of the problem due to the
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controversy about pharmaceutical companies selectively
releasing research about their products.
Far less attention is paid to the bias that occurs when some
results from a study are published, but the choice of which
results to publish produces bias. As with traditional pub-
lication bias, the tendency is to analyze data and choose
to present results which are statistically significant, further
from the null, or closer to what the researchers believe is
the true value. The implications for the literature as a
whole, though, are much the same as the file drawer bias.
I label this "publication bias in situ" (PBIS) because the
biased reporting of study findings exists within each indi-
vidual research report (with any metaphoric references to
cancer – the usual context of the phrase "in situ" in health
science –  left as an exercise for the reader). Despite the
similarities between the file drawer bias and PBIS, there
are fundamental differences. In particular, the bias from
some studies having no published findings exists only at
the level of the whole literature (no particular study can be
said to be biased), while PBIS exists within the results
reported from a single study (and thus exists in the litera-
ture as a whole by aggregation). More practically, PBIS is
substantially more difficult to even identify, let alone
correct.
This paper defines and describes PBIS and identifies some
of the choices that create it. The purpose of the paper is
not to make novel technical or statistical claims. Indeed,
there is probably no single statistical observation here that
will not be clear to a skilled data analyst (or, indeed, that
could not be explained to anyone competent in middle-
school-level math). The literature includes many observa-
tions about issues relating to PBIS. Yet the challenge to the
validity of the entire health science literature posed by
PBIS – arguably a greater issue than conflict of interest, tra-
ditional publication bias, or any other commonly dis-
cussed threat to the integrity of the literature – has not
received the attention it deserves.
In the literature about meta-analysis and systematic
reviews there is substantial attention to file-drawer publi-
cation bias (though most of this considers only bias from
reporting statistically significant results, ignoring prefer-
ences for reporting more dramatic results or those that
agree with authors' or journals' previous reports). But
there is considerably less attention to possible picking and
choosing which study results to report or statistical meth-
ods to use. To the extent that this is considered, it is often
bundled with questions about whether ex ante protocols
were stated and followed, and is thus put on par with
many protocol violations that could be considered mere
technicalities. For example, a few years ago, a highly-pub-
licized meta-analysis [2] called into question the evidence
on the benefits of screening mammography by citing
apparent problems in the methods of most of the relevant
randomized trials. But little was done to distinguish a few
of these problems that appeared to be PBIS and others
that were minor technical points.
The literature and pedagogy related to observational infer-
ence, where the potential for PBIS is considerably greater
than for well-designed experiments, seems to pay even
less attention. Epidemiology textbooks typically discuss
some of the methods that can reduce PBIS (e.g., well-
defined protocols), but say little or nothing about the pos-
sible bias. Indeed, many study and data-analysis method-
ologies (some of which are noted below) that are typically
taught in classes or by apprenticeship seem designed to
create PBIS. Despite this, highly-trained experts summa-
rize claims reported in the literature without mention of
the likely bias, indicating an unawareness of the major
implications of PBIS.
In a notable exception, Hahn and colleagues [3,4] dis-
cussed some sources of PBIS and argued that they receive
too little attention compared to bias from selective publi-
cation. Their analyses addressed selective reporting of sub-
group results in the context of randomized trials, a topic
further discussed below, and reporting a selected subset of
multiple measured endpoints. They do not mention the
other sources of PBIS discussed below. Unfortunately,
their findings do not appear to have had the impact they
deserved.
It is not clear how common PBIS is or how large the result-
ing bias, but a few efforts to find it suggest that the poten-
tial is great enough that it deserves much more attention.
(Labeling might matter: Hahn et al. label the problem
"within-study selective reporting." The more dramatic
name suggested here, with its emphasis on the bias that
results, might catch more attention.) Only by systemati-
cally addressing the problem are we likely to substantially
affect it. Moreover, as will be discussed, statistical and
research methods that ostensibly address some of the
sources of PBIS are unsatisfactory, and a systematic
attempt should be made to find better solutions.
Discussion
Many degrees of freedom
Reviewers (systematic or otherwise) of the literature can
only see what researchers choose to report and highlight
in their publications, and that choice can be biased in a
number of ways. Researchers have great freedom in decid-
ing exactly what to analyze, how to analyze it, and what to
report. All research results are derived from data that can
be used to measure many associations. Even the most nar-
rowly focused clinical trial can be analyzed with the end-
point defined in different ways, stratified by age, etc. As
with traditionally defined publication bias, the analysesBMC Medical Research Methodology 2004, 4:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/4/20
Page 3 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
that are deemed unworthy of publication are largely invis-
ible to the scientific and policy community.
Among the dimensions of freedom researchers have in
deciding what to analyze and report are three choices
illustrated by examples in this paper:
(1) Which exposures and outcomes to consider in datasets
with many variables.
(2) Which functional forms to use to represent variables
(e.g., how to divide continuous variables into categories).
(3) Whether to conduct separate analyses by subgroup,
and which subgroup results to emphasize.
Making such choices is a legitimate part of research.
Indeed, the choices must be made. But when those
choices are primarily driven by what produces stronger
(or otherwise "better") results, bias is created. This creates
a difficult challenge: It is easy to recognize traditional pub-
lication bias (paper in journal = no contribution to bias;
paper in file cabinet = contribution to bias). But since
there is no clearly correct option for any of the above
choices (indeed, any particular analysis gives the right
answer to some question), there is no clearly wrong choice,
and thus no clear way of concluding that a particular
choice was biased. Fortunately, as should become appar-
ent from the following analysis, PBIS results less from the
choices made and more from what the choices are based
on (which can often be inferred) and, to an even greater
extent, the generally overlooked issue of how the results
are presented (which can be easily observed).
Publication bias, either PBIS or the file-drawer effect, can
be seen most clearly as an interaction between random
errors and researcher choices (e.g., when random sam-
pling error leads to a weaker result, the result is less likely
to be reported), creating a bias from what would be unbi-
ased random variation. Systematic errors (confounding,
measurement error, etc.) and methods for correcting for
them create many additional opportunities for PBIS; how-
ever, for simplicity, systematic errors are ignored in this
paper.
Multiple analyses from the same data
Choice (1) in the above list has probably received the
most attention in previous literature (for example,
debates over whether to correct for multiple hypothesis
testing and the appropriateness of data dredging). Despite
the disproportionate attention, this choice is probably not
the major source of PBIS, but it provides a familiar starting
point.
Many epidemiologic datasets are characterized by thou-
sands or even millions of possible combinations of expo-
sures, endpoints, and covariates. It is frequently assumed
that statistical science tells us the "right" way to deal with
this challenge, but current practice (not to mention the
confusion of students coming out of epidemiology and
biostatistics classes) makes clear that there is substantial
disagreement among viewpoints about how to apply sta-
tistical methods when dealing with multiple hypotheses
or measurements. Further consideration makes it clear
that statistical rules cannot actually provide clear answers.
At one extreme are viewpoints such as, "We must correct
measures of statistical certainty (significance levels for p-
values (α-levels) or confidence interval widths) whenever
multiple comparisons are made using the same dataset"
and even, "statistical analysis can only be legitimate for a
short list of pre-specified hypotheses." At the other
extreme are viewpoints such as, "regardless of how many
comparisons are examined, each can be considered and
statistically tested as if it were the only one," and, "it does
not matter at all if a hypothesis was proposed after look-
ing at the data." The impasse in this debate seems to stem
from both sides attacking straw men, without recognizing
that each side has a stronger case some of the time. This
can be illustrated with examples.
Example: unrelated results from the same dataset
A cohort dataset originally used to report the relationship
of drinking water source and the occurrence of Helicobac-
tor pylori infection contains data that is later used to look
at the relationship of household crowding and perform-
ance in school. It is difficult to understand why we would
make an adjustment when doing the second analysis
because we have already done the first (or, worse, disallow
the analysis because it was not pre-specified in the study
or because we have already "used up" our .05 worth of α
with the H. pylori analysis, and so cannot analyze anything
more with this data at all). A logical extension of that
argument would be to consider the dataset that contains
all quantitative human knowledge (which is logically an
epistemologically legitimate definition), and declare that
we have to adjust for every statistical analysis ever done,
effectively precluding further statistical analysis.
Example: multiple comparisons that will support claims of the 
"same" relationship
Researchers investigate the hypothesis that poor nutrition
increases the risk of H. pylori infection. The dataset con-
tains dozens of different measures of food and nutrient
intake, as is usually the case for nutrition data. This, plus
multiple diagnostic tests for H. pylori which are sometimes
discordant, creates a large number of statistical compari-
sons, any of which could be described as supporting the
plain language claim, "poor nutrition affects H. pylori sta-BMC Medical Research Methodology 2004, 4:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/4/20
Page 4 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
tus." A typical approach is to find individual comparisons
that support the hypothesis, presenting only these com-
parisons with statistical tests as if each were the only anal-
ysis conducted. The claim about the relationship between
the particular measure of nutritional status and the partic-
ular measure of H. pylori status is accurate, as are the test
statistics reported for that association. But the plain lan-
guage conclusion (which would probably be drawn) was
very likely to be supported by some relationship in the
data by chance alone, even in the absence of any true
underlying association. This fact is obscured by the
reported unadjusted tests statistics or confidence intervals.
As the second example illustrates, unrestricted picking
and choosing of comparisons leads to publication bias. A
lot of associations that were not deemed worthy of report-
ing never appeared in the literature, while the few that
were "interesting" did. This problem is well known
(though few probably realize that it can lead to hundreds
of instances of publication bias, in situ within a single
published article, making it a bias of much greater magni-
tude than the file-drawer effect).
The solutions offered by statistical rules – corrections for
multiple hypothesis testing or restricting analysis to ex
ante  hypotheses – is inadequate. Such rules produce
absurd implications, noted in the first example. Trying to
eliminate the absurdity by exempting from statistical
adjustment analyses with disjoint exposures and out-
comes, as in the first example, does not work; the second
example offers options for disjoint analyses also. Most
important (and widely overlooked), correcting for multi-
ple comparisons does not affect the reported biased esti-
mates of effect size; changing test statistics and confidence
interval widths does nothing to reduce the bias. This alone
shows that the standard statistical corrections for multiple
tests do nothing to solve the problem. The other standard
method for trying to reduce PBIS, rules that limit analyses
to pre-specified hypotheses and protocols, will throw
away a lot of potentially valuable findings and is nearly
impossible to operationalize because detailed protocols
require advanced knowledge that may not exist and can
never be specified unambiguously.
Frequentist statistical theory cannot offer a solution to this
problem because PBIS, like the file-drawer problem, is not
a matter of statistics. The second example illustrates where
the problem primarily lies: in the plain-language report-
ing of results. The statistics that describe the relationship
between a particular exposure and outcome measure
could be exactly right, but the claim about good nutrition
(as a generic concept) and infection status (as if we had a
gold standard measure), which will likely be emphasized
in the paper and its title (and press releases) and will likely
stick readers' minds, might be misleading. Consider how
the result would be interpreted if there were a table report-
ing every analyzed comparison, most of which showed lit-
tle or no association. Most scientifically literate readers
would realize the result was not so convincing, even
though those same readers seldom think to object when –
as is typical – only one or a few results are reported. By
contrast, if the researchers in the first example reported
the result of the previous study, it would be unlikely to
change most readers' assessments.
This suggests the simplest partial solution to the problem.
By reporting a table of results from other comparisons
considered, researchers could report their interesting
result (rather than not informing the world due to the lack
of a specific ex ante hypothesis or having "used up" the α),
but without creating the PBIS that would result otherwise.
Indeed, this appears to summarize the most obvious
generic rule to reduce PBIS (and publication bias in gen-
eral): publish everything.
An immediate implication of this is that online publica-
tions, like this journal, allow researchers to publish less
biased articles. Online articles can usually be whatever
length is appropriate to report the results (which is of par-
ticular value in the health sciences, where paper journals
have extremely restrictive length limits), and can include
dozens or thousands of alternative analyses in appendices
or links to data or software that allow the reader to review
still more results. Of course, this opportunity is beneficial
only if authors choose to take advantage of it (or editors
and reviewers demand that they do).
Bias from the choice of functional form
The implications of choice (2), the functional form for
variables, can be clearly illustrated with a simple example.
Consider a study with an exposure variable measured as
10 ordered categories (i.e., values 1,2,...,10, with larger
numbers representing greater exposure). Assume research-
ers wish to analyze the association of a disease endpoint
and a dichotomous definition of exposure. If there is no
clear cutpoint for defining exposure, there are many
options. There are 9 cutpoints that divide the observations
into two categories, defining those above the cutpoint to
be exposed and those below unexposed. Other options
include comparing a group of highest categories to a
group of lowest categories, leaving out the middle, such as
8–10 versus 1–3, yielding an additional 36 possibilities.
How will the researchers choose a definition of exposure?
A typical procedure is to let the data inform the choice:
The cutpoint that provides the clearest contrast between
the exposed and unexposed is judged to be the right one,
the "most sensitive" to the presumed effect. It should be
immediately obvious that this procedure will bias the
result away from the null.BMC Medical Research Methodology 2004, 4:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/4/20
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To illustrate this, consider a case-control study with 200
subjects (throughout the examples, subjects are half cases
and half non-cases). Calculations for this example and
others are based on Monte Carlo simulation of different
realizations of the data based on the assumed underlying
relationship. All simulations were performed using Crys-
tal Ball (Decisioneering Inc., Denver, Colorado, USA).
Assume that each of the 10 exposure categories is equally
likely for cases and non-cases. If the researchers consider
only the 9 cutpoints that dichotomize the data and choose
the cutpoint for "exposed" to get the largest odds ratio
(OR), the median result will be 1.5. Since the exposure
and disease are not associated, this is clearly an upward
bias. For those inclined to focus on statistical significance,
the chance of observing a significant positive association
at a one-tailed significance level of .025 is 13%. (Of
course, for any single definition of exposure, the median
OR is 1.0 and the chance of seeing a significant relation-
ship is about 2.5%.)
Even if researchers do not analyze their data in every pos-
sible way and report the strongest association, any deci-
sion to report results that is based on associations in the
data (e.g., choosing between a cutpoint at 5 or at 6 based
on which produces a stronger association) will create bias.
Although this observation should be obvious to anyone
with an understanding of statistics, letting the data have
some influence on the choice is probably more the rule
than the exception among researchers. It is often defended
on the grounds that there was no way to know what the
"right" cutpoint was before doing the study, and the study
data is the only existing answer to the question. This is a
legitimate point, but it does not reduce the resulting bias.
Less scrupulous researchers – who are trying to support a
preferred answer to further a policy agenda or advance
their careers – need make no such explanation and can
intentionally choose the extreme results.
As with the file-drawer effect, results in the literature will
tend to show effects greater than the true value. Most
important, whichever analysis is reported, the plain-lan-
guage result will be "we found an association between the
exposure and the disease," and so collections of studies
that each report an exposure-disease comparison with a
greater-than-average association, and will seem to be con-
firming the same result, even though the comparisons are
not the same.
Extending this example to illustrate how PBIS can com-
pare to traditional publication bias, assume now that
there is a positive association between the exposure and
disease. In particular, non-cases are still equally likely to
be in each of the ten categories, while cases have respective
probabilities for each category of (.069, .072, .077, .084,
.093, .102, .112, .121, .131, and .139). These values were
chosen so that the true OR is similar, whichever of the 9
cutpoints is chosen (for those interested, the numbers fol-
low a logistic curve). True ORs round to 1.5 for all
cutpoints.
Consider a collection of studies of varying sizes, with
fewer larger studies, as we would typically see in the liter-
ature, specifically 100 randomly generated studies (more
than would likely exist, but better to illustrate) of random
size (drawn from a triangular distribution with modal
probability at a minimum value of 100 subjects, dimin-
ishing linearly to a maximum of 1600 subjects). Note that
to avoid committing the very type of transgression dis-
cussed in this paper – repeating an analysis until "good"
results are found – the reported results are from the first
and only run of the simulation.
For a single definition of "exposed" (values >5), a typical
result appears in Figure 1 in the form of a funnel plot of
study results vs. study size [1,5,6]. The results that are sta-
tistically significantly different from 1.0 at the two-tailed
.05 level are represented by solid dots. The other results
(represented by open circles) might never be reported –
the simplest form of publication bias – though they could
be inferred from the asymmetry of the distribution that
would occur if only the significant results were published.
Notice that the distribution for all the studies is unbiased
and would lead to an estimate very close to 1.5, while a
naive summary estimate based only on the statistically
significant studies (possibly the only ones published)
could almost double the estimated effect size.
Compare this to the results for the same 100 studies where
the cutpoint is chosen based on the largest OR (Figure 2).
The distribution is also substantially biased, with PBIS
leading to results above the single-definition results of
1.5. A summary estimate of effect size would turn out to
have substantially greater bias than would reporting only
significant results as in Figure 1. Notice that though there
is a skew, it is much harder to discern a pattern like the
asymmetry in Figure 1 that would show a systematic
reviewer that the literature is biased.
Unbiased random errors, when combined with picking
and choosing functional forms, lead to biases in reported
results. A solution to this problem is much less obvious
than its existence.
The commonly proposed solution of only reporting
results for pre-specified functional forms is not satisfac-
tory, because it is difficult to enforce (most every pre-spec-
ification has some room for interpretation in retrospect;
intentional cheating is difficult to detect; there may be lit-
tle basis for selecting any particular pre-specifiedBMC Medical Research Methodology 2004, 4:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/4/20
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functional form) and it forces us to ignore real unpre-
dicted findings. Sticking to pre-specified analyses is espe-
cially unrealistic in research studies that collect data on
many different risk factors and outcomes. Simply labeling
all results that were not pre-specified with the caveat,
"hypothesis generating," accomplishes nothing. If such
results were actually treated as not yet "real", the problems
of determining exactly which results were pre-specified
and the loss of important serendipitous findings are
reintroduced. Of course, results with the caveat are very
seldom treated as less real than any others in the literature.
Moreover, the "generated" hypotheses will never be
retested in exactly the form reported, so the label is simply
disingenuous. In sum, the proposed solutions to this type
of PBIS are no more realistic or satisfactory as solutions
than trying to eliminate traditional publication bias by
requiring that all studies be adequately powered.
A better family of solutions would be to establish a stand-
ard of reporting results for alternative variable definitions
(perhaps in online appendices). Not only does this
directly reduce PBIS by publishing more results, but it pro-
vides readers with a choice of results if they prefer differ-
ent definitions (information that would be discarded by a
pre-specified hypothesis rule). If results for every cutpoint
from the 100 trials in the example were reported, the
results, as pictured in Figure 3, would be unbiased. Natu-
rally, researchers could emphasize the variable definitions
they think best, but by acknowledging other possibilities
they would be forced to justify their choice.
In many cases there will not be an obvious short list of
variable definitions, but some alternative definitions
should be obvious and others could be found in previous
literature. A simple, but very useful, improvement would
be a standard practice of reporting the closest possible rep-
lication of previous published analyses using data from
the new study. This would directly address the problem of
PBIS resulting from data-driven picking and choosing of
functional forms (though it might require the cooperation
of previous authors to provide details about what analysis
they reported, given the typically abbreviated reporting of
Traditional publication bias from simulated studies Figure 1
Traditional publication bias from simulated studies. Simulated results from case control studies with varying populations (half 
cases, half non-cases) for true odds ratio of 1.5. Solid circles represent statistically significant results at the 2-tailed, .05 level. 
(Note: x-axis scale chosen for compatibility with other figures.)
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methods in published papers – another problem with pal-
try word limits). Repeating whatever analyses that previ-
ous researchers happened to choose is somewhat
arbitrary, but each round of new research can also add a
new preferred functional form. The key is that results
based on previously published functional forms cannot
be data driven and, unlike the standard practice of new
studies that make different comparisons but describe
them with the same plain language, would actually repli-
cate (or fail to replicate) previous results.
Bias from the analysis of subgroups
In 2003, VaxGen Corporation (Brisbane, California, USA)
released results of a large HIV vaccine trial in the United
States, one of the highest-profile clinical trials of the year.
The disappointing result showed a trivial reduction in
incidence among the treatment group compared to the
placebo group. But the three non-white racial groups
(black, Asian, and "other") each showed a substantial
reduction in incidence (Table 1). VaxGen reported the
overall failure of the trial to the popular and business
press [7,8]. A technical report describing the drug and the
trial results, written by a third party, appeared later in an
indexed journal [9], though the New York Times articles
actually contained more complete study results. VaxGen
tried to salvage some hope for the drug by pointing out
the results for non-whites, suggesting that maybe it held
promise for some populations [8]. VaxGen's search for a
silver lining resulted in rash of criticism from the research
community (focused on the reporting of a result that was
not a pre-specified hypothesis and the failure to correct for
multiple hypothesis testing) and a shareholder lawsuit,
alleging that statistically illicit reporting was used to
inflate stock prices [9-12].
Given the failure to publish the results in a scientific jour-
nal, some might argue that VaxGen was guilty of tradi-
tional publication bias – not publishing unfavorable
results about its products – a charge that is currently being
leveled at many drug companies. However, the company
Publication bias in situ from simulated studies Figure 2
Publication bias in situ from simulated studies. Simulated results from case control studies with varying populations (half cases, 
half non-cases) for true odds ratio of 1.5. For each simulated study, the largest odds ratio (choosing among 9 different cut-
points for exposure definition) is reported. (Note: one outlier odds ratio estimate not shown.)
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actively released fairly complete study results and accom-
panying analysis to the press, and the results appeared in
forums that are more widely read than all scientific jour-
nals combined, so the results were clearly not buried in a
file drawer.
But despite reporting their results, VaxGen was biasing
what they published. Singling out of the result for non-
whites is a clear case of PBIS. VaxGen did not give equal
emphasis to the apparently harmful effect of the vaccine
for whites. The company's subsequent report that the
Publication bias in situ eliminated by reporting all results Figure 3
Publication bias in situ eliminated by reporting all results. Results from Figure 2, but with results for all possible cutpoints 
reported.
Table 1: Results of VaxGen HIV vaccine trial
total vaccine placebo RR
subjects subjects incidence subjects incidence
white 4511 3003 179 1508 81 1.11
nonwhite 498 327 12 171 17 0.37
black 314 203 4 111 9 0.24
Asian 73 53 2 20 2 0.38
other 111 71 6 40 6 0.56
total 5009 3330 191 1679 98 0.98
Source: The New York Times [7] and author's calculations.
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different results for whites and non-whites could not be
due to chance [9] does not diminish the apparent bias,
since it basically repeats the same information contained
in the original (data-driven, biased) reporting of the result
for the non-white subgroup.
Setting aside some controversy that erupted about system-
atic errors in the data, what can we say about the results
from the perspective of PBIS and chance alone? To look at
the result for non-whites, with its one-tailed p-value of
.002, ignoring the fact that the subgroup definition was
clearly data-driven, would overstate the finding, as sug-
gested in the preceding examples. But a naive correction
for multiple hypothesis testing would make the opposite
error. Setting aside the possibility that other covariates
would have been used to stratify the data had they pro-
duced subgroups with positive findings, the combination
of the 4 racial groups implies a test of 24-1 = 15 different
hypotheses. To adjust for 15 implicit hypotheses makes it
very unlikely that any will pass the statistical test, includ-
ing the population as a whole, even for substantial
associations.
An alternative is to ask the question, "if the vaccine has no
effect, what are the chances of seeing, in any racial group
or combination thereof, a result at least as strong as the
observed 63% reduction?". Phrased that broadly, simula-
tion shows the answer is about 20%. However, most of
the 20% comes from the unstable results for the two
smallest groups, Asians and "other". Restricting the analy-
sis to combinations of racial groups that contain black,
with or without Asians or other, the probability is only
2.1% (the probability of seeing a 63% reduction by
chance alone for any group that includes the whites is van-
ishingly small).
So, what is the right answer? We must return to the obser-
vation that there is never a single Right Answer from a
study; the quality of an answer always depends on what
question was being asked. Did VaxGen find a successful
vaccine? Clearly not, as the relative risk for the whole pop-
ulation shows. Should the result for non-whites be con-
sidered unlikely to be due to chance (i.e., statistically
significant)? It depends on whether you consider it the
answer to the question "does the vaccine show a result for
non-whites?", in which case the answer is 'yes' (though
the effective study size is small), or "does the vaccine show
a result for any racial group?" in which case the answer is
'it is fairly likely we would see such a result due to chance
alone.' It is worth noting how this illustrates a popular fal-
lacy in data analysis: Frequentist hypothesis testing is not
the objective exercise that some think it to be; it depends
on subjective decisions about what to test.
We might decide to infer that VaxGen would have empha-
sized the results from any racial subgroup that showed a
positive result (and the company did claim the original
protocol called for analysis by racial and other subgroups
[9]), and thus that they were answering the latter ques-
tion. Notice that none of the options that are typically
practiced or recommended are satisfying. To just report
the subgroup analysis as if it were the only analyzed result
obviously leads to bias. (It is worth noting that in a less
high-profile research project, that might well have hap-
pened, without anyone questioning the result.) But it is
not satisfying to suppress the tantalizing findings about
non-whites, either because there was not really an ex ante
hypothesis that the vaccine would work only in non-
whites or because the multiple-hypothesis correction for
hundreds of possible racial and other subgroups makes it
non-significant. A general rule requiring us to ignore inter-
esting but surprising findings is a huge waste of informa-
tion. Requiring a data-driven subgroup analysis to be
biologically plausible before reporting it offers no solu-
tion, since we can usually construct a story to explain
whatever associations appear in the data (it has been spec-
ulated that some genotypes get a benefit from the vaccine,
and the frequency of those genotypes is strongly corre-
lated with race).
To offer the "hypothesis generating" caveat would make
little difference, scientifically or in the securities market. It
is unrealistic to suggest that this "generated" hypothesis
will be re-examined given the overall disappointing result.
Two studies in Thailand (one completed later [13], which
also found the vaccine ineffective, and another by the U.S.
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease that
may continue to use the vaccine anyway [14]) are likely
the closest anyone will come to re-examining the hypoth-
esis, but a population of Thais is hardly the same as non-
white Americans. Furthermore, this example shows how
epistemologically absurd the hypothesis generating caveat
is: The result could originally have been considered
hypothesis generating. But a few days after the results were
released the company claimed that they had an ex ante
plan to analyze racial and other subgroups [9], which
would presumably promote the result "hypothesis con-
firming". However, that claim by the company, accurate
or not, was completely uninformative about the effect of
the vaccine, telling us nothing about the certainty of the
findings, and so cannot legitimately change our
conclusions. It does not matter whether the hypothesis
was pre-specified. Debating whether the company really
proposed the subgroup analysis ex ante, as if that should
change our interpretation of the result, seems particularly
absurd.
When Hahn et al. [3] observed apparent selective report-
ing of subgroup analyses, they suggested identifyingBMC Medical Research Methodology 2004, 4:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/4/20
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subgroups in the protocol, keeping that list as short as
possible, and implicitly called for reporting results for all
pre-specified subgroups. But since every measured covari-
ate creates two, several, or a continuum of possible sub-
groups, this approach would require ignoring a lot of the
results of a study, no matter how interesting they are (as
well as severely taxing the imagination of the researchers
about which subgroups are the right ones). Since it is
unrealistic to expect researchers to not report interesting
results (let alone to not even do the analysis that would
produce those results) after spending months or years
gathering data, we need methods that allow the reporting
of results but with less bias.
The obvious general solution is to report all subgroup
analyses with equal prominence. Any reporting (be that a
research paper, abstract, paper title, or press release) that
suggests there is a beneficial effect for some people should
equally emphasize any apparent harmful effects for other
people (and vice versa). The fact that one result is statisti-
cally significant and the other is not should be of no con-
sequence. Indeed, selecting which results to report based
on statistical significance guarantees there will be publica-
tion bias (and, more generally, the inappropriate empha-
sis on statistical significance may be the source of a large
amount of PBIS, but this point must be left for future anal-
yses). The reporting of the multiple subgroups results
should be accompanied by statistics similar to those cal-
culated here, instead of standard test statistics, so that
readers know the probability that an estimated effect (or
test statistic) at least as great as the one found would result
from chance alone for any of the subgroup analyses. Such
information will allow readers (researchers working on
related projects, policy makers, investors) to focus on
what they consider to be the answer to their own
questions.
Summary
The opportunities for PBIS, along with the almost univer-
sal failure to report research results in ways that avoid it,
create the possibility that biased study results are very
prevalent in the health science literature. Some of the
causes of PBIS are well understood, but the enormity of its
implications is largely ignored.
PBIS can produce very misleading results, leading to wide-
spread misperceptions and misguided policies. The exam-
ples presented here show just a few of the many ways that
PBIS can result from random error and researchers' (usu-
ally innocent, almost always invisible, possibly quite rea-
sonable) choices. Neither the problem nor the solution
lies in the mathematics of data analysis, so answers will
not be found by appealing to statistical theory. The critical
issue is the completeness of reporting and the plain-lan-
guage interpretation of results.
The simple solutions offered by statisticians are not satis-
fying or even realistic. All they really let us do is observe
that in almost every research report, "the rules" have been
violated. This is not helpful. Rather than a right-vs.-wrong
view of proper use of statistics that would condemn most
of the literature as invalid, we need a realistic way of
addressing this problem. The solutions, like the solutions
for traditional publication bias, will generally consist of
doing a more complete job of reporting what can be
reported.
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